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A NEW ROLE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE: A MODEL TO ENFORCE END
USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS
JESSICA GALLEGOS*
ABSTRACT
This Note examines tortious interference, provides an overview of its controversial history and scholarly critiques, and evaluates new uses for tortious interference in the digital
age. Through an overview of recent case law from the unlikely field of copyright law, this
Note uncovers a new phenomenon in the law: parties to copyright litigation are using tortious interference as a model to enforce end user license agreements. This is both genius and
problematic. It is genius on the part of those bringing breach of end user license agreement
claims because tortious interference grants companies a remedy at law when third parties
induce end users to breach their end user agreement. In the digital age, it provides a solution to companies faced with a reluctance to endure enormous litigation costs and public
relations nightmares that accompany direct suits against potentially thousands of end user
consumers of their products.1 However, the solution of tortious interference is also problematic in the digital age: it creates an incentive for companies to write end user agreements
without ever intending to enforce the terms against the end users themselves. Instead, these
companies intend to enforce the terms against their competition. This is extremely questionable because it usurps the underlying philosophies of both tortious interference and contract
law. Ultimately, this Note suggests that tortious interference should be affirmed as a new
model to enforce end user license agreements. However, this Note also suggests limiting this
new model’s negative implications with a burden-shifting misuse doctrine, which preserves
the heroic attributes of tortious interference and limits it to protect the integrity of contract
law.
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1. “In the mass market, licenses are usually ‘enforced’ by the good will of the end
user, not by litigation. The cost of enforcing contracts in a court of law with multiple individuals would be prohibitive in most cases.” Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious
About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 696
n.50 (2004). The Napster and YouTube phenomena exemplify copyright owners’ reluctance
to sue end users. See Nate Anderson, Viacom’s Top Lawyer: Suing P2P Users “Felt Like
Terrorism,” ARS TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/11/viacoms-toplawyer-suing-p2p-users-felt-like-terrorism.ars (Viacom general counsel explains that suing
end users is “expensive, and it’s painful, and it feels like bullying.”).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright owners attempt to control end users2 through copyright
and contract law. This is nothing new. Traditional copyright law
seeks to limit copyright owners’ control of and allow public access to
copyrighted works. One such limit allows public access to copyrighted
works when copyright terms expire. The recent enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)’s Anticircumvention Rule3
expanded copyright owners’ power to protect their digital property in
the internet age by permitting them to rewrite and expand traditional copyright limits. Copyright owners subsequently used their newly
acquired DMCA power to limit end users’ use of copyrighted products
through end user agreements and DMCA preventative mechanisms.
Because of the immense amount of power that it afforded copyright
owners, many scholars advocate rewriting the DMCA text to limit
that power.4 Contract law provides another avenue for copyright
owners to expand public use of copyrighted works through end user
license agreements (EULAs). To address this alternate avenue, some
advocate a DMCA misuse doctrine that bars copyright infringement
claims when copyright owners expand their power beyond traditional
copyright limits through EULAs.5
This Note demonstrates that such solutions address only half of
the problem: they leave tortious interference with a contract as another tool with which companies can control end users and their
2. For the purposes of this Note, “end user” refers to consumers who ultimately buy
and use a copyrighted product.
3. See discussion infra Section III.A.
4. See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the
Night: Reforming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 495, 499-500 (2004) (arguing that click-wrap and shrink-wrap licenses chill speech
about products, suppress competition, and allow copyright owners to contract around
copyright law).
5. Id. at 501.
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competition. The recent cases of MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc.6 and Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark
International, Inc.7 illustrate a pattern of companies’ attempts to control end users through both the DMCA and tortious interference.
Thus, even if critics convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule or to create a DMCA misuse doctrine, tortious interference provides yet another model for companies to control end users
by suing third-party competitors when end users breach end
user agreements.
This is a new use for tortious interference. An examination of tortious interference’s history and an analysis of relevant cases reveal
that using tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs is necessary in some cases and problematic in others. Tortious interference
serves a new, legitimate role because of the litigation costs involved in
suing potentially thousands of end users and the public relations concerns in the digital age.8 It grants companies a remedy at law when
third parties induce end users to breach their end user agreements.
However, companies can also misuse tortious interference when writing their end user agreements when they do so without the intention of
enforcing them except against their competitors. Ultimately, this Note
suggests that tortious interference should be affirmed as a new model
to enforce EULAs. However, this Note also advocates a misuse doctrine to limit this new model’s negative implications.
In Section II, this Note generally discusses the historical background and critiques of tortious interference. In Section III, this Note
presents the cases of MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. and Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., where companies used DMCA claims and tortious interference with end user agreement claims against competitors to control the use of their copyrighted products. Section IV discusses the
positive and negative implications of this new use of tortious interference to enforce end user agreements. This Note responds by proposing a misuse doctrine that attempts to preserve the positive implications and limit the negative implications of this new use. Finally, Section V invites others to test this misuse theory on the broader
scale of tortious interference, generally.

6. 616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Ariz. 2009); MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No.
CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL 2757357 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
7. 615 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
8. “In the mass market, licenses are usually ‘enforced’ by the good will of the end
user, not by litigation. The cost of enforcing contracts in a court of law with multiple individuals would be prohibitive in most cases.” Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious
About User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing For Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 687, 696
n.50 (2004). The Napster and YouTube phenomena exemplify copyright owners’ reluctance
to sue end users. See supra note 1.
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II. BACKGROUND OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE
This Note argues that the digital age provided another opportunity to expand the application of tortious interference to enforce end
user agreements. The history and expansion of tortious interference
provides a backdrop necessary to truly appreciate the benefits of and
problems associated with the new model. The claim’s property and
anticompetition policy roots confirm that using tortious interference
as a means to protect intellectual property interests through EULAs
is extremely faithful to the history of tortious interference. The great
expansion of tortious interference from those humble beginnings also
foreshadows the potential for misuse by copyright owners as discussed later in the Note.
A. The History of Tortious Interference
Tortious interference began as tool to protect Roman and English
property interests in their servants before it morphed into a fullblown cause of action.9 Before its official recognition, courts began
applying the emerging cause of action to further anticompetition policies during labor shortages.10 The Queen’s Bench officially recognized the first tortious interference cause of action when it held theater owner Gye liable for inducing opera singer Johanna Wagner to
breach her contract with another theater owner named Lumley.11
Apparently the court reasoned that the historical property interest
created between a master and servant was sufficiently similar to the
property interest created between freely contracting parties who enter a contract for personal services. Inducing Wagner to breach her
contract constituted malicious interference with Lumley’s property

9. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129, at 97980 (5th ed. 1984); Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663,
664-65 (1923) (citing the Ordinance of Labourers, 23 EDW. III (1349)); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510, 1513-15 (1980) (discussing that business
tort was not recognized until the nineteenth century).
10. Sayre, supra note 9, at 665-66; see also Gary D. Wexler, Intentional Interference
with Contract: Market Efficiency and Individual Liberty Considerations, 27 CONN. L. REV.
279, 285 (1994).
11. As early as the fourteenth century, the application of tortious interference where
competition interfered with one’s potential or current customers was recognized; however,
tortious interference was not actionable until the nineteenth century. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Tex. 2001); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, BUSINESS TORTS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION HANDBOOK 106 n.11 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter ABA
HANDBOOK]; Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationship in the Nineteenth Century: The Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, supra note 9, at 1522; cf. Frederick
H. Cooke, A Proposed New Definition of a Tort, 12 HARV. L. REV. 335, 339 (1898) (addressing whether the liability for inducing breach should arise when it is a natural outgrowth of
competition).
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interest in that contract and triggered tort liability.12 The Lumley
court established liability in “all cases where there is an unlawful
and malicious enticing away of any person employed to give his personal labour or service for a given time under the direction of a master or employer who is injured by the wrongful act.”13 This holding
left open the door for expansion of the rule in contexts beyond the
master/servant relationship; in fact, the holding explicitly defined
master/servant relationships as including contractual relationships.14
B. The Great Expansion of Tortious Interference
Since the court first applied tortious interference in Lumley v.
Gye, the cause of action has expanded rapidly and in many directions. Courts have applied tortious interference to many contexts:
interference with prospective business relationships,15 merely advising a party to breach,16 franchise contexts, labor-law disputes (indeed, it is the foundation for strike law),17 antitrust disputes,18 interference with advertising,19 and interference with the expectation of
inheritance.20 Juries have also awarded plaintiffs massive punitive
damages for tortious interference claims.21 One commentator has
even suggested that it should be applied to interference with the expectation of a gift.22
The tort’s standard of liability and elements varies greatly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.23 Most courts attempt to use the Restate12. Lumley v. Gye, [1853] 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) 754; see also Sayre, supra note 9,
at 667-68.
13. Lumley, [1853] 118 Eng. Rep. at 754.
14. The Lumley court held that liability extends to the master/servant relationship,
which includes situations “where a party has contracted to give his personal services for a
certain time to another.” Id. at 755.
15. Temperton v. Russel, [1893] 1 Eng. Rep.(Q.B). 715, 715.
16. J.D. Edwards & Co. v. Podany, 168 F.3d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1999).
17. David Howarth, Against Lumley v. Gye, 68 MOD. L. REV. 195, 209 (2005). Tortious
interference claims relating to both labor-law and antitrust disputes are now largely subject to preemption. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic
Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 62 n.4 (1980).
18. Perlman, supra note 17, at 62 n.4.
19. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd. v. Koch, 599 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Daisy Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Abbott, 473 S.E.2d 47, 48-49 (S.C. 1996); see also Chhina Family P’ship,
L.P. v. S-K Grp. of Motels, Inc., 622 S.E.2d 40, 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
20. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.E. 390, 391 (N.C. 1936); Harmon
v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1021-22 (Me. 1979).
21. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4 (1987) (awarding Pennzoil $3 billion in
punitive damages).
22. Note, Intentional Interference with the Expectation of a Gift, 48 HARV. L. REV. 984,
984 (1935).
23. Derek G. Howard & Mary B. Cranston, The Interference Torts, in BUSINESS TORTS
& UNFAIR COMPETITION: A PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 95, 99 (A. Michael Ferrill ed., 1996);
see Wexler, supra note 10, at 291-92. This can also be deduced from a mere scanning of
cases, law review articles, handbooks, and jury instructions which cite to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
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ment’s standard of liability because, despite the Restatement’s vague
requirements, it remains one of the most straightforward articulations of the doctrine.24 The Restatement requires five elements to
prove tortious interference liability: (1) a valid contract (or prospective contractual relations),25 (2) knowledge of the contract by the interfering party, (3) intentional and improper inducement to breach
the contract,26 (4) actual breach, and (5) damages.27 In response to
practice-oriented and academic confusion as to what “improper”
means, the Restatement provides seven factors to determine if an improper act exists:
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct,
(b) the actor’s motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.28

Courts tend to apply these factors against the interests of the allegedly interfering party because, when balancing the interests of society (preserving their “security of transaction”), the contracting party
(preserving her freedom to contract) and the interfering party (preserving her freedom to act, compete, and create),29 the interfering
party will almost always lose. When an interfering party is a competitor, both the Restatement of Torts and the Restatement of Unfair
Competition hold that a contracting party’s interest in a secure marketplace typically trumps the conflicting interests of the interfering
24. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 98-99.
25. So long as the contract is not otherwise void by public policy, tortious interference
liability will be found. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, at 994. Voidable contracts may be
the basis for a tortious interference claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 cmt. f
(1979). Some courts do not find liability for tortious interference with an at-will contract,
reasoning that at-will contracts do not guarantee performance. See Flash Elecs., Inc. v.
Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 379, 404 (E.D.N.Y 2004); GuardLife Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449 n.4 (N.Y. 1980); ABA
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 118.
26. Initially, courts required malice to attribute tortious interference liability to a
defendant, but failed to adequately define malice. To clear up the confusion around the
malice standard of liability, the Restatement changed the malice standard to “improper,”
attributing liability to a third party “who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
performance of a contract . . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
causing the third person not to perform the contract.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
766 (1979).
27. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 99.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
29. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 107; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 767 (1979).
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party’s right to compete—and thus reject competition as a defense in
favor of a secure marketplace,30 balancing the interests heavily
against the interfering party.31 Where a contract exists, the drafters
of the Restatements prefer contractual stability, resulting in deference to the plaintiff as he asserts the elements of his tortious
interference claim.
Where the plaintiff successfully asserts all elements of a tortious
interference claim, the defendant may respond with a privilege to
interfere. A privilege is essentially a party’s assertion that the context or circumstances surrounding the alleged interference render
the conduct appropriate.32 But even searching for a privilege will not
save a competitor. Lawful competition is not a privilege for tortious
interference where an actual contract exists.33
C. Critiques of Tortious Interference
Advocates defend tortious interference as a safety valve of contract law by providing a remedy where contract law should but fails.
For instance, tortious interference serves to remedy the perceived
inadequacy of contract law damages, which usually do not avail
plaintiffs damages when the breaching party is insolvent,34 when the
plaintiff cannot sue its many breaching end users due to the cost and
bad taste of litigation, or in most cases where the plaintiff seeks litigation expenses or emotional or punitive damages.35 It also protects
the institution of contractual relationships by deterring behavior that
leads to breach, thus preserving relational integrity between parties36
and the moral basis of contract law.37

30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767(d); see also Howard & Cranston, su-

pra note 23, at 112-13.
32. Howard & Cranston, supra note 23, at 107; Perlman, supra note 17, at 91-93; ABA
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 108.
33. Where there are only prospective economic relations (no contract), tort law allows
competition as a privilege against liability so long as the interfering party used lawful
means to vie for potential customers and was not motivated by subjective desire to harm
his or her competitor. Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition
in Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1993) (arguing
that tortious interference liability may “chill legitimate business practices”).
34. Wexler, supra note 10, at 305.
35. Contract law rarely awards punitive damages. See generally William S. Dodge,
The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999).
36. William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians, Community, and the Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1176 (1996).
37. If a promise between two parties places a moral duty on a third party to refrain
from interfering, and breaching a contract is also considered an immoral act, then the interfering party and the breaching party have acted equally immorally: both breach moral
duties to refrain from obstructing the performance of a promise.
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Further, tortious interference provides a method for allocating
risk of breach to the least cost avoider.38 Traditional contract law allows parties to allocate risk between each other. Interference by a
noncontracting third party upsets the bargained-for equation, including the allocation of risk. Where contracts are necessarily incomplete
because they say nothing of liability to third parties, tortious interference steps in to complete the contract when third parties intervene, acting as a default rule. It allocates the liability to the least
cost avoider—the interfering party. It creates incentives for contracting parties to sue the interfering party because a tortious interference claim results in a punitive damages award (where a mere contract claim does not). This restores the balance when third parties
upset the normal flow of a contract by interfering and allocates harm
to the least cost avoider: the tortious interferer.39
Critics of tortious interference endorse the limitation or altogether
elimination of tortious interference because of its perceived inconsistencies with contract law and its vague standard of liability.40 Tortious
interference is inconsistent in many ways with contract law: it doles
out punitive damages on a regular basis,41 imposes obligations on
parties who lack privity to the contract,42 and is inconsistent with a
Holmesian theory of contract.43 Granting punitive damages arguably
gives parties more than the benefit of their bargain44 and throws off
the cost-benefit analysis in which parties engage when they bargain
for their exchange. Tort liability in contract is in and of itself problematic: breach of contract never constitutes a tort unless a “legal
duty independent of the contract itself has been violated,”45 so it
seems inconsistent to attribute tortious liability on a third party for a
breach that would never impute tort liability to a contracting party.
It also says nothing of efficiency created by tortious interference. To
address this, efficient-breach theorists argue that tortiously interfer-

38. Wexler, supra note 10, at 316-17 (explaining the theories of Landes and Posner).
39. Id.
40. See Woodward, supra note 36, at 1127.
41. Granting punitive damages arguably gives parties more than the benefit of their
bargain. Wexler, supra note 10, at 294-95.
42. See Howarth, supra note 17, at 195 (arguing that “contract law is optional” and
should not typically impose “obligations on unwilling parties”).
43. J. Oliver Wendell Holmes sees nothing moral about contract law—for to breach a
contract is simply to invoke a right to breach; a contract is merely a legally enforceable
promise that gives parties a choice between keeping the promise or paying a compensatory
sum of damages. JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 1 (9th ed.
2008). If Holmes is right, then there is no moral problem with inducing someone to breach
a contract, for you are merely helping her exercise a right.
44. Wexler, supra note 10, at 293-95.
45. 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 1 (2010).
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ing parties should be rewarded, not punished, when their interference fosters efficient breaches.46
The largest area of critique characterizes tortious interference as a
“broad and undefined tort in which no specific conduct is proscribed and
in which liability turns on the purpose for which the defendant acts,
with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be considered improper in some undefined way.”47 Scholars critique the Restatement’s improper standard as vague: “[t]he problem with the interference tort lies
in the complete absence of any principle that will explain to us what
judgments to make” and when to impose liability.48 Critics argue that
courts apply the cause of action too broadly on an ad hoc basis, with no
clear and consistent standard of liability across jurisdictions.49
III. A NEW USE FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE: A MODEL TO ENFORCE
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS
A. Background of Digital Millennium Copyright Act and End User
License Agreements
In the digital age, the DMCA and contract law provide opportunities for copyright holders to avoid traditional copyright limitations
and to control their end users and their competition. Copyright owners exploit one such opportunity by using a preventative mechanism
in the form of digital code to prevent access to their copyrighted digital work. When anyone circumvents that preventative mechanism,
the DMCA creates a cause of action for the copyright owner against
the circumventer. Copyright owners can potentially misuse this
DMCA Anticircumvention Rule by placing preventative mechanisms
on noncopyrighted works thus expanding his control over his work,
46. The existence of tortious interference as an available cause of action may also
deter efficient breach because it complicates the usual contract incentives for performance
and breach. Many Efficient-Breach theorists posit that tortious interference necessarily
conflicts with efficiency and therefore generates undesirable outcomes by (1) discouraging
efficient breaches (because it imposes a tort incentive to refrain from intervening instead of
a contract efficiency incentive that might require intervention when breach is more efficient than performance); or (2) encouraging too many breaches, even when it may be inefficient to do so (because it adds a second potential defendant upon breach, the contracting
party may be more apt to breach because the nonbreaching party may sue the tortious
interfering party instead of her). Lillian R. BeVier, Reconsidering Inducement, 76 VA. L.
REV. 877, 930 (1990); see Woodward, supra note 36, at 1139.
47. KEETON ET AL., supra note 9, § 129, at 979.
48. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L.
REV. 335, 346 (1981).
49. One attempt to redefine the standard of liability is Perlman’s Unlawful Means
Test, which makes liability available only where the interfering party used unlawful
means to interfere. Perlman, supra note 17, passim. Another attempt is Dowling’s Expansion of Unlawful Means, which makes liability available only in cases of interference where
the plaintiff has no other remedy and the interfering party used unlawful means to interfere. Donald C. Dowling Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference
with Contract Beyond the Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487, 513-18 (1986).
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services, and products. This, in turn, enlarges copyright owner control over consumers and end users beyond what the drafters of traditional copyright law intended. In response, critics in droves suggest
that the legislature should revise areas of the DMCA to better match
traditional copyright law.50
Copyright owners also employ contract law to expand their rights
to control copyrighted work beyond traditional boundaries. By writing limits of use in end user license agreements upon the sale of copyrighted works to consumers, copyright owners expressly limit access
to copyrighted material by both end users and competitors.51 These
agreements often take the form of shrink-wrap and click-wrap
agreements. Shrink-wrap agreements derive their name from the
shrink-wrap packaging around software. Inside the package are license agreements, many times drafted by the copyright owners and
enforceable at law as a contract. When the consumer opens the
“shrink-wrapped” product, “the user assents to the software terms
enclosed within.”52 Click-wrap agreements are the digital equivalent
of shrink-wrap agreements, but the consumer “clicks” on the digital
product to assent to software terms.53
While most courts uphold shrink-wrap and click-wrap user
agreements as enforceable contracts, many academics seek to limit
their enforceability.54 Users rarely read or understand the terms of
click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements and they afford an enormous
amount of power to copyright owners. Shrink-wrap and click-wrap
agreements constitute offer and acceptance upon the unilateral offer
and subsequent keeping of the product by the end user, which implies the end user’s consent to the end user agreement terms.55 Because end users rarely read the terms, critics argue these agreements

50. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1136
(2003); see also G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and
Efforts to Establish Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office, at 360-61 (Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, PLI Order
No. 19139, 2009).
51. Copyright owners relegislate their rights through “ubiquitous clickwrap and
browsewrap licensing.” Loren, supra note 4, at 495; see also Elizabeth M.N. Morris, Will
Shrinkwrap Suffocate Fair Use?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 237, 266
(2007).
52. Richard G. Kunkel, Recent Developments in Shrinkwrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in the United States, 9 MURDOCH U. ELEC. J. L. 3 (2002),
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v9n3/kunkel93.html.
53. Id. at ¶ 38.
54. See generally Loren, supra note 4, at 508-12 (arguing that unconscionability,
deeming contracts void as against public policy, and preemption of EULAs by copyright law
generally fail to combat potential misuses of click-wrap and shrink-wrap EULAs).
55. Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 18 (2002).
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lack mutuality.56 These end user agreements place enormous power
in the hands of companies.57
With the knowledge that end users rarely read the agreements
and that courts will enforce the terms, copyright owners draft end
user agreements to include terms that benefit the copyright owner
and control the use of their products.58 Companies use EULAs to prevent end users from benchmark testing or reverse engineering their
products, to regulate the resale of their products, and even to prohibit
end users from review or criticism of their products or the companies
themselves.59 As soon as courts began enforcing the terms of shrinkwrap and click-wrap agreements, companies recognized tortious interference as a second model (beyond traditional breach of contract
actions) to enforce those agreements. This is illustrated by the MDY
Industries, LLC and Lexmark, Inc. cases.
These cases also reveal the positive and negative implications of
tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs. First, even if
DMCA critics convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule to prevent use of the DMCA or contract to expand copyright
terms beyond traditional copyright law through EULAs, copyright
owners can continue to enforce shrink-wrap and click-wrap EULAs
through tortious interference to control end users and competition.
This is great because tortious interference benefits copyright owners
and other companies where it is close to impossible to attain damages
from end users through a direct breach of contract action.60 But, it
also gives rise to potential misuse by companies who draft terms with
no intent of ever enforcing them against the contracting party—and
only intend to enforce the terms against competition.
B. MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc.
Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. created World of Warcraft (WoW),
the “largest and most successful multiplayer online game in the
world,”61 that allows many players to interact with each other
through “avatars,” live in-game interaction, and voice-chat, as if they
are all in the same room, though they may be continents apart in reality.62 One of the three main goals in WoW is to enjoy the social,

56. Id.
57. Loren, supra note 4, at 496-98.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 497.
60. See id. at 496-97 (discussing the increased use of click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements because of increased ability for copyright owners to control copyrighted material).
61. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962 (D. Ariz. 2009).
62. Plaintiff MDY Industries, LLC, and Third Party Defendant Michael Donnelly’s
Statement of Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, MDY Indus.,
616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (No. CV06-02555-PHX-DGC).
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role-playing feature of the game.63 In addition to buying the game
itself, a WoW end user must also subscribe to an online account for a
monthly fee.64 She must also agree to the terms of Blizzard’s EULA
and terms of use agreement, which allow her to install the software
onto her computer(s) and make one “archival”65 compact disc copy of
the game. When the end user launches WoW to access WoW game
servers, she makes a copy of WoW on her computer’s Random Access
Memory (RAM).66
The terms also prohibit the end user from creating or using “bots .
. . or any other third-party software designed to modify the World of
Warcraft experience.”67 A bot (short for “software robot”)68 is a program enabling users to play WoW on “auto-pilot,” which allegedly
results in a direct loss of WoW’s income because it causes user dissatisfaction by destroying the live aspect and fair competition in the
game.69 To enforce the EULAs, Blizzard monitors the end user’s computer RAM with a program called “Warden” to detect the use of a
third party program enabling the use of bots.70 Upon such detection,
the license agreement gives Blizzard grounds to cancel the end
user’s account.71
Michael Donnelly, doing business as MDY Industries, Inc., created
and subsequently sold the program “Glider” to WoW users.72 Glider is
a bot that plays WoW on autopilot while users are away from their

63. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc. and Vivendi Games, Inc. Statement of Facts in Support of
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, MDY Indus., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958 (No. CV0602555-PHX-DGC).
64. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 2.
65. Id. at 3.
66. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 10.
67. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 19.
68. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 10.
69. Id. at 11-13 (“[B]ots can play much longer than a human without stopping.”). Bots
harm WoW because they cause a loss of revenue resulting from (1) a loss in monthly fees—
bots can advance faster through the use of automated play, shortening the life of the game,
and in turn, reducing life of monthly payments to WoW, (2) a loss of WoW users—bots destroy the integrity of the game, in that other users now play against bots (who have a perceived unfair advantage of jumping levels and gain WoW wealth at unequal rates) instead
of live players, and (3) employee time spent dealing with user complaints about bots and
detecting the bots. Id. at 11, 15. From December 22, 2004 to March 18, 2008, Blizzard received over 465,000 user grievances against bots. Id. at 15.
70. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 7; Blizzard and Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 20-22.
71. See Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62 at 7;
Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 20-22.
72. Glider is also known as “WoWGlider” and “MMOGlider.” Blizzard and Vivendi’s
Statement of Facts, supra note 63 at 3, 22; Benjamin Duranske, MDY Industries v. Blizzard: Preliminary Filings Complete; Protective Order Entered, VIRTUALLY BLIND
(Sept. 6, 2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/09/06/mdy-v-blizzard-summary-and-updatepreliminary-filings-complete-protective-order-entered/.
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computers and purposefully circumvents Warden’s detection.73 On
MDY Industries’ Glider website, a message warns WoW customers that
using Glider constituted a breach of Blizzard’s end user agreement.74
Instead of suing its end user consumers, Blizzard Entertainment
sued MDY Industries under the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule75
and tortious interference. The United States District Court of Arizona held that when an end user logs on to play WoW and accesses
WoW game servers, she makes an unauthorized copy of WoW on her
computer’s RAM because authorized use bans the user from bot software. The court found MDY Industries liable on both counts.76 Even
if Congress altered the DMCA, Blizzard Entertainment would still
win on the tortious interference claim.77
The court reasoned that (1) Blizzard Entertainment’s user agreements constitute valid contractual relationships; (2) that Donnelly,
doing business as MDY Industries, knew of the user agreements because he agreed to one himself as a WoW user; (3) MDY Industries
intentionally and improperly interfered with and caused a breach of
the end user agreement; and (4) Blizzard suffered damages because
the bots destroyed the live aspect of the game, and customers left or
would leave as a result.78 To determine the third prong of whether
Donnelly acted improperly, in an earlier order addressing a motion
for summary judgment the court used the Restatement’s seven factors, granting most weight to the following: (1) MDY Industries knowingly assisted the breach of valid contracts between users and Blizzard Entertainment; (2) MDY Industries intentionally avoided detection of that interference, thereby placing Blizzard at risk; and (3)
MDY Industries was motivated by financial gain.79 Minimizing MDY
Industries’ interests, the court explained that the success of its crea73. Plaintiff & Third Party Defendant’s Statement of Facts, supra note 62, at 9-11.
Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 12.
74. Blizzard & Vivendi’s Statement of Facts, supra note 63, at 33.
75. The court reasoned that (1) “WoW has a valid copyright in the dynamic, nonliteral
components of the game”; (2) access to those elements is controlled by Warden, the technological measures Blizzard designed to effectively control access to its copyrighted game
WoW, which Glider circumvents; (3)/(4) Glider gives users unauthorized access to WoW, in
that the user need not be screened by Warden; (5) once users gain this unauthorized access, they can copy the elements as they are displayed (onto the user computer’s RAM); and
(6) Glider is specifically designed and marketed to circumvent Warden. MDY Indus., LLC
v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 967-68 (D. Ariz. 2009) (holding that MDY
Industries violated 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006)). Warden monitors user access only with
respect to the nonliteral, user-interface component of the game, as opposed to the literal
code of the game, which Warden is not designed to monitor. Id. at 966-67. Thus, Glider only
circumvents Warden’s monitoring of nonliteral aspects of the game. Id.
76. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971, 973. (D.
Ariz. 2009).
77. See id. at 970-71.
78. Id.
79. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL
2757357, at *15-16 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
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tive innovation interest literally depended on the success of WoW and
implied that MDY Industries’ actions were exploitative,80 parasitic,
and not competitive.81
C. Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.82
Lexmark, a manufacturer of printers and printer accessories, includes a patented chip in every Lexmark ink cartridge that matches
a mirror chip in every Lexmark printer such that end users of
Lexmark printers cannot use any other manufacturer’s ink cartridge
with a Lexmark printer.83 The court refers to this mechanism as
“handshake” technology because the chip in the Lexmark cartridge
must “shake hands” with the chip in the Lexmark printer to work.84
Lexmark also placed a DMCA-type preventative mechanism in the
printer software to prevent others from obtaining access to handshake technology.85 Lexmark sells its customers two types of cartridges: discounted cartridges that come with a prebate agreement on
the shrink-wrap package and full-price cartridges with no such
agreement.86 The prebate terms restrict the end user from using the
cartridges more than one time, and after that initial use, the terms
bind the end user to return the cartridge to Lexmark for “remanufacturing and recycling.”87
A company called Static Control provides printer-related services
to the end users of many printer brands,88 and sells microchips to
third-party companies for use in remanufactured toner cartridges.89
This chip enables Lexmark printer users to purchase and use Static
Control ink cartridges in Lexmark printers.90 Lexmark filed copyright infringement and tortious interference claims91 arguing that
80. Id. at 16.
81. Id.
82. Discussion of this case is based off of two different orders. In one ruling, the circuit
court ruled on the DMCA cause of action. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 545-53 (6th Cir. 2004). In a separate ruling, the district court
ruled that the prebate agreement constituted a contract for the purposes of tortious interference by denying Static Control’s motion for partial summary judgment that there are no
prebate or return “[c]ontracts” “[b]ecause Lexmark [c]annot [s]how any [m]eeting of the
[m]inds.” See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 830,
860 (E.D. Ky. 2007).
83. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 530.
84. Id.
85. Lexmark claimed that the code was a “checksum” device that acted as a security
system and therefore constituted an anticircumvention device. Id. at 531. The court disagreed. Id.
86. Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
87. Id.
88. See Static Control Components, http://www.scc-inc.com/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
89. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d at 529.
90. Id. at 550.
91. Lexmark filed “claims for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and civil conspiracy.” Static
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Static Control had to tamper with Lexmark’s DMCA anticircumvention handshake code to obtain the handshake software. Lexmark also
argued that its prebate agreement constituted a contract between
Lexmark and Lexmark end users, thus Static Control tortiously interfered with Lexmark’s EULA.92
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky struck down the DMCA claim. The court found that Lexmark’s
preventative mechanism did not sufficiently control access to the
printer’s handshake software code because anyone who purchased a
Lexmark printer could read the copyrighted code from a Lexmark
printer’s memory. The postsale reuse restriction on the cartridge was
unenforceable under the first-sale doctrine.93
Although the tortious interference claim is currently pending appeal, the district court upheld Lexmark’s prebate EULA as a valid
contract94 despite Static Control’s arguments that the prebate agreement lacked mutuality because it denied customers the opportunity
to agree to the terms and conditions of the prebate contract.95 The
district court analogized the preterms to shrink-wrap licenses that
take effect when the customer unwraps the package (when he can
read and agree to those terms).96 If the Lexmark court follows the
MDY court’s reasoning—and the current standard of liability for tortious interference—it will likely hold Static Control liable for tortious
interference. Lexmark’s EULA constitutes a valid contractual relationship. Static Control likely knew of the prebate EULAs. Using the
seven Restatement factors, the court will likely hold Static Control’s
knowledge of the prebate terms and motive of financial gain sufficient to prove that Static Control intentionally and improperly interfered with Lexmark’s prebate EULA. If Lexmark can prove that it
suffered damages because it never received the used cartridges,
Lexmark will likely also win a tortious interference claim against
Static Control.

Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
92. “Lexmark’s Return Program provides consumers with discounted prices on cartridges if they agree at the time of purchase to return the empty cartridges to Lexmark.”
Charles Brewer, Lexmark’s Return Program: Prebate for Inkjet Cartridges, RECHARGER
MAGAZINE, (Dec. 1, 2006), http://rechargermag.com/articles/2006/12/01/ lexmarks-returnprogram-prebate-for-inkjet-cartridges.aspx.
93. See Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575,
588 (E.D. Ky. 2009).
94. Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 860 (refusing to affirm Static
Control’s motion for partial summary judgment which argued that Lexmark cannot show
any meeting of the minds therefore there are no prebate or return contracts).
95. See id. at 844-45.
96. Id. at 845.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE AS A MODEL TO
ENFORCE END USER LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND A PROPOSED
MISUSE DOCTRINE
A. Implications of the End User Cases
The two cases discussed above illustrate two important developments in the doctrine of tortious interference. First, even if critics
convince Congress to limit the DMCA’s Anticircumvention Rule, tortious interference claims remain available for companies to control
end users and expand copyright terms through EULAs. Second, the
expansion of tortious interference has both legitimate and problematic implications. Blizzard’s legitimate use reveals that tortious interference serves an important role by providing a practical remedy
when end users breach the terms of EULAs and contract claims
against the end users themselves would be too costly, both financially
and politically. However, Lexmark’s use of tortious interference corners the cartridge market and suggests the need to limit tortious interference as a model to control end users. Therefore, while tortious
interference serves a new, legitimate role granting companies a remedy at law when third parties wrongly assist end users to violate
their contractual obligations, the misuse of tortious interference to
control competition suggests this new model needs limits.
The difficulty of enforcing WoW EULAs and the fact that gamers
could not breach without the help of MDY Industries’ Glider program
justifies Blizzard’s use of tortious interference. Even without the
DMCA claim, Blizzard Entertainment’s appropriate use of tortious
interference allows it to control end user access and use of WoW. In
MDY Industries, tortious interference serves a valid role by protecting a EULA from interference by a third party. Typical WoW gamers
could not breach without the help of MDY Industries. Without MDY
Industries’ bot program, Glider, WoW gamers have no practical or
immediate way to breach the WoW EULA term banning the use of
bots. As the court held, the success of MDY Industries’ creative innovation interest literally depended on the success of WoW. The court
implied that MDY Industries’ actions were exploitative and parasitic,
instead of innovative and competitive.97
Blizzard’s EULA establishes grounds on which Blizzard may cancel an end user’s account that uses Glider—an unattractive remedy
because cancelling the end user’s account can lead to that end user
no longer paying the monthly WoW fee to play the game. With thousands of WoW end users, litigating each breach would result in
enormous costs and bad public relations. Thus, enforcing the terms of
97. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DCG, 2008 WL
2757357, at *16 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2008).
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their agreement or suing the end users for breach of contract renders
Blizzard without a practical contract remedy. Tortious interference
provides an alternate remedy by preventing MDY Industries from
providing the Glider program that enables end users to use bots and
breach the terms of the WoW EULA. The impractical remedy of enforcing WoW EULAs, paired with gamers’ inability to breach without
the help of MDY Industries’ Gilder program, justifies Blizzard’s use
of tortious interference.
In contrast, Lexmark’s use of EULAs raises concern that it drafts
prebate agreements with the intent to enforce the terms against competition not its users, which is an illegitimate use of tortious interference. As discussed above, Lexmark will likely prevail on its tortious
interference claim because the court upheld Lexmark’s prebate agreement as a valid contract. Lexmark has two possible motives to bring
this claim: one, to get the benefit of the prebate agreement bargains
since prebate cartridges were sold at a discounted price and two, to
keep competition like Static Control out of the cartridge industry.
While Lexmark has a valid contract claim against the end users, a
close look reveals that a tortious interference claim is illegitimate. A
successful tortious interference claim would allow Lexmark to indirectly
control its end users by preventing Static Control from helping Lexmark
end users get a better deal on printer cartridges. Here, the users do not
need Static Control’s help to breach the prebate agreement. Lexmark
printer owners do not need help to fail in returning the cartridge.
Lexmark end users can breach without Static Control’s interference.
Instead of providing an alternate remedy where a third party enables
the end users to breach where it is otherwise impractical, tortious interference would allow Lexmark to control its cartridge market.
While it may not be the case here, Lexmark’s use of tortious interference illustrates the potential for companies to draft contracts with
no intent of ever enforcing the terms against end users, but with the
sole intent of enforcing the terms against the competition. As with all
third parties to a contract, competitors like Static Control have no
bargaining power under the EULA terms and no way to escape a tortious interference claim under the current system.
These claims suggest a new use for tortious interference—a means
to control end users. In both cases, the courts upheld the existence of
a contract when Lexmark and MDY Industries used shrink-wrap
(prebate) and click-wrap EULAs.98 Instead of enforcing terms against
breaching end users who use bots or fail to return a cartridge to
98. Enormous power is placed in the hands of companies, causing the massive, though
so far unsuccessful movement to limit the enforceability of shrink-wrap and click-wrap
agreements. See generally Loren, supra note 4, at 495 n.2 (providing a representative sample of scholarly articles).
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Lexmark for “remanufacturing and recycling,”99 the companies used
tortious interference as a model to enforce the terms against competition. Even if courts strike down DMCA claims, tortious interference
grants copyright owners another method to control end users’ access
to their copyrighted material. This is problematic in Lexmark because Lexmark is trying to monopolize the cartridge market. But,
tortious interference is appropriate in MDY Industries because it
overcomes the difficulty of enforcing WoW EULAs against end users
in a context where end users cannot breach without the help of third
party MDY Industries.
B. Implications of Tortious Interference as a Model to Enforce End
User License Agreements
As discussed in Section III.A., because end users rarely read or
understand the terms of click-wrap and shrink-wrap agreements,100
EULAs place enormous power in the hands of copyright owners to
draft terms that regulate the use of their copyrighted works.101 With
knowledge that end users rarely read the agreements and that courts
will enforce the terms, copyright owners draft EULAs to include a
massive amount of terms that benefit the copyright owner and control the use of their products.102 These cases illustrate that as soon as
courts began enforcing the terms of shrink-wrap and click-wrap
agreements, companies recognized tortious interference as a second
model (beyond traditional breach of contract actions) to enforce
agreements. This is both beneficial and problematic.
As seen with Blizzard, sometimes the use of a tortious interference claim is the only practical remedy available to contracting parties—especially when used to enforce EULAs—because cost and public relations concerns render impractical the attainment of damages
from end users through a direct breach of contract action.103 Therefore, courts should not completely eliminate tortious interference as a
model to enforce EULAs. It provides a cause of action to companies
like Blizzard Entertainment, where there is no practical claim at law
in the absence of tortious interference because EULA breach claims
are too financially and politically costly.
This use of tortious interference also allows the cause of action to
serve its traditionally valid role of providing a stable marketplace by
encouraging parties to make contracts, supplementing contract law
99. Static Control Components, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
100. See Loren, supra note 4, at 497; cf. Determann & Fellmeth, supra note 55, at 18
(noting that software publishers generally do not require users to expressly confirm acceptance of the terms of the EULA).
101. See Loren, supra note 4, at 497.
102. Id.
103. See sources cited supra note 50.
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by availing punitive damages when the breaching party is insolvent,
enforcing the morality of promise, and allocating liability to the leastcost avoider of the harm.
However, as seen in Lexmark’s use of tortious interference, tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs gives rise to potential
misuse by companies who draft terms of EULAs with no intent of ever enforcing them against the end users, but rather competition, with
the goal of suppression. This highlights one of the major problems
inherent to imputing liability to a party with no privity to the contract, as discussed in Section II.
C. A Proposed Misuse Doctrine
In response to the potential misuse and benefits of tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs, this Note suggests a misuse
doctrine to prevent companies from enforcing a EULA with tortious
interference by drafting their EULA without intent to enforce the
agreement against the end user.
1. Defendant’s Proof of Lack of “But For” Causation Triggers
Presumption of Misuse
Under this misuse doctrine, the burden initially rests on the
plaintiff to prove tortious interference under the seven Restatement
factors. If the plaintiff proves tortious interference and the contract
at issue is a EULA, then the defendant can bring a misuse defense: if
the defendant proves that the end user could have breached the EULA independent of the defendant’s actions, the court will find a presumption of misuse on the part of the plaintiff and bar the tortious
interference claim. The court will presume, as a matter of law, that
the plaintiff drafted the terms of the EULA to enforce against third
parties, rather than end users.
If the defendant fails to prove the end user could have breached
the EULA independent of the defendant’s actions, the defendant may
be liable for tortious interference. Liability still exists in all tortious
interference cases with EULA claims against defendants where the
end user could practically not have breached “but for” the defendant’s
conduct. This provides a safety valve for plaintiffs to use tortious interference as a model to enforce EULAs when she has no viable alternative cause of action or remedy at law.
2. Rebutting the Presumption: “Specific Targeting and Soliciting”
and “No Other Use”
If the defendant successfully proves that the end user could have
breached independent of the defendant’s actions, the plaintiff can rebut the presumption of misuse (that it drafted the EULA terms with-
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out intent to enforce them against the end users). To rebut the presumption, the plaintiff must provide evidence that the defendant targeted and solicited its end users to breach their EULAs and that
there is no other use for the defendant’s conduct, product, or service
other than to help the end user breach. In other words, the defendant
specifically targeted and solicited the parties to the plaintiff’s contract. Once this proof is established, the plaintiff can successfully rebut the misuse presumption and assert tortious interference with a
EULA. This provides a second safety valve for the use of tortious interference to enforce EULAs when the plaintiff has no other cause of
action available because of the massive amount of end users it would
need to sue to find a true remedy (and the defendant is actually at
fault for the breach).
D. Application of the Proposed Misuse Doctrine
1. As Applied to MDY Industries, Inc.
The misuse doctrine allows the proper use of tortious interference
with EULAs in the digital age. When WoW end users operate MDY
Industries’ Glider software to use bots in WoW, they breach their
EULA with Blizzard Entertainment. As seen in the MDY Industries
opinion, applying the seven Restatement factors finds MDY Industries liable for tortious interference.
MDY Industries might try to invoke the misuse doctrine by arguing that Blizzard Entertainment’s end users could circumvent WoW
security without the help of MDY Industries’ Glider bot, and just
happened to use Glider to do it. A successful circumvention might
look like evidence provided by MDY Industries showing that the
WoW end user who breached the particular EULA before the court
happens to be a computer programmer capable of writing her own bot
software. While possible, this scenario is unlikely to apply to all WoW
users that breached the EULA and used bots.
Even if MDY Industries successfully invokes the misuse doctrine,
Blizzard Entertainment can rebut the presumption of misuse by asserting that MDY Industries specifically solicits and targets WoW
customers. MDY Industries’ Glider website warning to WoW customers that using Glider breaches their contract with Blizzard Entertainment evidences such specific solicitation and targeting. MDY
specifically made Glider to circumvent Warden and allow the use of
bots in WoW software. The misuse doctrine does not prevent Blizzard
Entertainment from bringing a tortious interference claim if there is
no other use for Glider beyond providing bots for WoW users.
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2. As Applied to Lexmark
Applying this to Lexmark, the burden of proof would rest on plaintiff Lexmark to prove tortious interference with their EULA. If
Lexmark successfully proves that Static Control tortiously interfered
with its EULA, then Static Control can invoke the misuse doctrine as
a defense. To invoke the misuse doctrine, Static Control must show
that its end users had the ability to breach without any help from
Static Control. Here, Static Control successfully meets that burden
because Lexmark’s end users can use cartridges more than once or
fail to return cartridges to Lexmark without the help of Static Control. For instance, the prebate terms do not prohibit Lexmark users
from independently selling their used cartridge to another Lexmark
customer. The end users can breach independently of Static Control’s
refill program. Therefore, the court would find misuse and presume
as a matter of law that Lexmark drafted its prebate terms with no
intent of ever enforcing them against its consumers.
Unless Lexmark can rebut the presumption of misuse by proving
that Static Control specifically targeted and solicited Lexmark end
users to breach the prebate agreement, the misuse doctrine would
bar Lexmark’s tortious interference claim. Lexmark will likely fail to
rebut the presumption because Static Control provides other services
to end users of other printer brands.104 Static Control’s refill program
and microchips have uses beyond filling solely Lexmark cartridges,
and unlike MDY Industries, Static Control has no website or other
marketing material that specifically targets and solicits Lexmark
customers. Therefore, the misuse doctrine would bar Lexmark from
bringing a tortious interference claim.
3. Potentially Problematic End User License Agreements
As discussed in Section III.A., companies use EULAs to prevent
end users from benchmark testing or reverse engineering their products, to regulate the resale of their products, and even to prohibit end
users from review or criticism of their products or the companies
themselves. The misuse doctrine addresses other possible misuses of
EULAs that are struck down under the DMCA misuse model.105 For
instance, when an end user downloads NetBeans software created by
Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Microsystems) and Oracle Corporation, she
agrees to Microsystems’ EULA that prohibits the publication or provision to any third party of any tests on or comparisons of the prod-

104. See Static Control Components, http://www.scc-inc.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
105. See Loren, supra note 4, at 518 (discussing Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2003)).
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uct.106 If the end user were to breach the agreement and post a review
of NetBeans on Amazon.com, for example, tortious interference theoretically allows Microsystems to sue Amazon.com if Microsystems
meets the Restatement test, which, as illustrated in this Note, is not
difficult to do. Therefore, tortious interference currently allows Microsystems to control the content of Amazon.com without ever drafting a contract with Amazon.com.107
If Microsystems proves that Amazon.com tortiously interfered
with Microsystems’ contract with Microsystems’ end users, Amazon.com may invoke the misuse doctrine by asserting that Microsystems’ end users can critique NetBeans anywhere they wish and just
happened to post critiques on Amazon.com’s website. The misuse doctrine prevents Microsystems from suing any party that runs a forum
encouraging discussion about products because the end users’ breach
does not depend on any of the forums specifically. Under the proposed misuse doctrine, the court would presume, as a matter of law,
that Microsystems drafted the terms of the EULA to enforce against
third parties, never intending to enforce the terms against its
end users.
Microsystems could then only win on tortious interference if it
proves that Amazon.com specifically targeted and solicited the consumers to review NetBeans. Because Amazon.com sells many products and offers a forum for reviews of those products from many different manufacturers, it did not. There are many uses for Amazon.com beyond critiquing NetBeans. Therefore, Microsystems would
fail to rebut a finding of misuse and the doctrine would bar Microsystems from a tortious interference claim to control the content
of Amazon.com.

106. License Agreement for NetBeans with JavaFX (NB 6.9.1 / FX 1.3.1), Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) Software License Agreement § 5(f), https://cds.sun.com/isbin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/CDS-CDS_Developer-Site/en_US/-/USD/ViewLicenseStart?LicenseUUID=PHGJ_hCwLwQAAAEqBzUMmzR.&ProductUUID=TK2J_hCwOHQ
AAAEq154MmzR_&cnum=&evsref=&sln= (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (“You may not publish or provide the results of any benchmark or comparison tests run on Software to any
third party without the prior written consent of Sun.”). Professor Lydia Pallas Loren’s research on end user agreements that expand copyright terms via contract law provides a
similar example: the exclusive licensee of Disney’s online movie trailers must agree to an
EULA term prohibiting commentary that is “ ‘derogatory to or critical of the entertainment
industry or of [Disney] . . . or of any motion picture produced or distributed by [Disney].’ ”
Loren, supra note 4, at 518 (quoting Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc.,
342 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2003)).
107. This may not succeed on tortious interference because the defendant, here Amazon.com, must know that there is a contract to be liable for tortious interference. This assumes that Amazon.com knows about the contract between Oracle and Oracle’s end users.
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E. Implications of the Proposed Misuse Doctrine
The misuse doctrine prevents companies from drafting EULAs to
corner the market, as Lexmark did with its EULAs. It also prevents
misuse by companies who draft contracts specifically to enforce
against third party competitors and not actual contracting parties—
because if the end user could independently breach the EULA, the
doctrine bars a tortious interference claim. However, the misuse doctrine allows room for tortious interference when justified and necessary to protect contracts from meddling third parties, as in Blizzard
Entertainment’s use of tortious interference against MDY Industries.
Finally, the misuse doctrine prevents companies like Sun Microsystems, Inc. from enforcing EULAs restricting review or criticism of
their products.
Admittedly, this misuse theory is underinclusive because it leaves
many cases where the end user can breach independently,
but there is no practical remedy for the plaintiff other than tortious
interference. While Lexmark still has a breach of contract claim at
law against its many breaching end users, such claims do not provide
a practical remedy at law because the expensive cost of litigation far
outweighs recovering a few dollars worth of lost profit due to their
unrealized prebate discount scheme; it also does not address the alienation of Lexmark customers should it bring a breach of EULA action against its end users directly.
However, the misuse doctrine prevents the potential misuse of tortious interference: the practice of drafting terms with no intent of ever enforcing them against the contracting party. It allows a tortious
interference cause of action, a safety valve, where a contracting party
has breached as a direct cause of the defendant's action (in many
cases, where no practical remedy for the plaintiff exists beyond tortious interference).
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note examined tortious interference, its controversial history, and the new uses for tortious interference in the digital age.
Through an overview of recent cases from the unlikely field of copyright law, we find that parties to copyright litigation are using tortious interference as a model to enforce end user license agreements.
This is both genius and problematic. It is genius on the part of those
bringing breach of end user license agreement claims because tortious interference grants companies a remedy at law when third parties induce end users to breach their end user agreement. It solves
the problem posed by enormous litigation costs—not to mention public relations expenses—required to sue potentially thousands of end
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users in the digital age.108 However, tortious interference can also be
misused in the digital age: it creates an incentive on the part of companies to write end user agreements without ever intending to enforce the terms against the end users themselves. Instead, these
companies intend to enforce the terms against their competition. This
is extremely questionable because it usurps the underlying philosophy of tortious interference and contract law; it also expands copyright terms beyond that intended by the DMCA. Ultimately, this
Note suggests that tortious interference should be utilized as a new
model to enforce end user license agreements. However, this Note
also suggests limiting this new model’s negative implications with a
burden-shifting misuse doctrine, thus preserving tortious interference only where necessary to fill in the gaps of contract law.
While this Note limits its discussion of tortious interference misuse to EULAs in the digital age specifically, the theory could be applied on a broader scale to tortious interference generally. While the
misuse doctrine does not address some of the perceived inconsistencies between tortious interference and traditional contract law, like
efficient breach, it redefines and narrows the vague standard of liability that haunts tortious interference. It could prevent the enforcement of contractual terms against third parties who never bargained
for them and could narrow the forever poorly defined scope of tortious
interference liability to one requiring targeting and soliciting of the
breaching party. The misuse doctrine could preserve and promote the
truly heroic safety valve function of tortious interference beyond the
EULA context while simultaneously limiting its less admirable attributes to preserve the integrity of contract law.

108. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 8.

